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In the Supreme Court
of the
State of Utah
FRANK D. WATKINS and VENIA
WATKINS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

-vs.-

Case No. 9131

GLEN M. SIMONDS and BEVERLY
J. SIMONDS,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiffs brought an action on June 12, 1958,
to- restrain defendants from blocking the flow of water
through a certain ditch on the defendants' property and
to require them to clear said ditch and enjoin future
blocking of said ditch.
A temporary restraining order was issued and after
a hearing on the order, the court took the matter under
advisement on June 16, 1958. Judge Martin M. Larson
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at that time refused to require the removal of the obstruction until September 10, 1958, when Judge Larson entered
an order continuing the restraining order, and on September 26, 1958, entered a further order allowing the
plaintiffs to open the ditch until the matter was heard on
its merits.
The defendants moved for summary judgment and
subsequently plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
which was answered by the defendants. Plaintiffs also
filed a motion for summary judgment. The motions were
noticed by the defendant and were heard by the court on
July 16, 19·59. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, plaintiffs' motion dismissed, and the
summary judgment entered on July 31, 1959.
The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint
without leave of court, and on the 11th day of August,
1959, filed a motion to set aside judgment, to amend and
to maintain the status quo.
The court refused the ex parte application of the
plaintiffs to set aside judgment, and denied leave to
amend on the same date. On the 24th day of August,
1959, plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial (R. 57) and
a motion to _alter summary judgment and to amend
(R. 58). Both motions were denied by the court in an
order dated August 31, 1959. On August 29, 1959, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal.
Prior to the entry of summary judgment on July 31,
1959, the court considered the memoranda submitted at
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3
the request of the plaintiffs and without objection by
the defendants, said memoranda being to clarify plaintiffs' contention as to the facts set forth in the first
amended cornplaint which "\vere taken as admitted by
defendants for purposes of the summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF TI-lE FACTS
This statement of facts is set forth as taken fron1
plaintiffs' amended complaint (R. 12-19) and the plaintiffs' mernoranda (R. 40-50), together with plaintiffs'
diagram (R. 50), and not as reconstructed and altered
in plaintiffs' brief.
The parties are owners of Lots 6 (plaintiffs') and B
(defendants'), Block 2, Holladay Heights Plat "A", Salt
Lake County. Plaintiffs acquired Lot 6 through various
conveyances from Alliance Realty Company, who conveyed to plaintiffs' predecessor on December 19, 1950
(R. 41). Alliance Realty ·Company had not yet acquired
Lot 3, which was acquired on July 20, 1951, and conveyed
to defendants' predecessor on December 31, 1952 (see
plaintiffs' memoranda, R. 41).
In 1950 and previous thereto, water had come to Lot
6 by a ditch along the south side of Block 1, Holladay
Heights Plat "A", along Lots 5 to 8 of said Block 1,
thence north along the east side of Lot 6, Block 2, and
north along a line near the center of Block 2 to Lincoln
Lane, see plaintiffs' amended complaint, paragraph 3 (c)
(R. 13) and Plat (R. 50), "blue" route.
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After ·Clover Lane was established subsequent in
1950, the water came to Lot 6 by the "red" route, plaintiffs' amended complaint, 3 (d) (R. 13) and Plat (R. 50).
On or about July 1, 1952, the ditch in dispute was constructed, plaintiffs' amended complaint, 4(a), (R. 13).
The ditch in dispute was never used to bring water to
Lot 6 until 1955, plaintiffs' amended complaint, 4(b)
(R. 14). The water would be more accessible to Lot 6
by the original route existing at the time of dedication
of the subdivision (R. 50), "blue" route.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
'THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS TO THE DEFENDAN TS.
1

POINT II
THE DISTRI·CT COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO PERMIT PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND THEIR ~COMPLAINT
FOLLO·WING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

ARGUl\fENT
POINT I
'THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS TO THE DEFENDAN'TS.

First Cause of Action

The court having taken the allegations of plaintiffs'
amended complaint as ad1nitted on July 16, 1959, and
having allowed the plaintiffs to present a 1ne1norandum
to cure inconsistencies and a plat showing the water
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routes, did not err in granting the defendants' rnotion
for surnmary judgment, the plaintiffs' pleadings and
Ineinoranda sho,ving clearly (a) that at the time plaintiffs purchased through their predecessor Ford, there
was no ditch in use where the disputed channel lies,
plaintiffs' a1nended co1nplaint, 4(a) (R. 13 and 14), and
(b) prior to 1955 \Vater had never come to Lot 6 across

the '''"est side of Lot 3, plaintiffs' amended complaint,
4 (b) (R. 13) .

Second Cause of

Acti~on

Plaintiffs' second cause of action incorporates the
first cause \vhich shows the present ditch used only
since 1955, giving no prescriptive rights, plaintiffs'
an1ended complaint, 4(b) (R. 14) and plat (R. 15).
Third Cause of Action

Plaintiffs' pleadings affirmative show that since the
time of dedication of the subdivision the water has come
to Lot 6 by three distinct routes, two of which are more
accessible to the source of the water than the route over
which plaintiffs claim a right-of-way (Plat, R. 50). Further, the shares of water owned by the plaintiffs are
shares in a private irrigation company, plaintiffs' amended complaint, 2 (b) (R. 12), and as such, are by statute
not appurtenant to the land, 73-1-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
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Fourth .and Fifth Causes of Action
The fourth and fifth causes of action of the plaintiffs' amended complaint (R. 12-18) are moot.
The District Court took the matter of summary
judgment under advisement on July 16, 1959, and at
plaintiffs' request allowed plaintiff to file a memorandum
prior to ruling. In the memorandum, plaintiffs set forth
facts uncontested by the defendants which showed both
parties' chain of title (plaintiffs' memorandum, R. 41)
showing that Alliance Realty Company had acquired and
disposed of Lot 6 prior to acquiring Lot 3. Lot 6 was
sold to Carl Ford by Alliance on December 19, 1950, and
Lot 3 was not acquired by Alliance Realty until July 20,
1951.
In July of 1952, when the ditch was constructed,
plaintiffs' amended complaint, 4(a) (R. 13), ·Carl Ford
owned Lot 6 and Alliance Realty owned Lot 3, hence no
unity of title while the ditch was in use.
The complaint and the memoranda set forth that
the water came to Lot 6 prior to 1955 by the "red" route
(R. 50), and in spite of this plaintiffs alleged that the
ditch on the west of Lot 3 was obvious, visible and in
continual use when the defendant took title to Lot 3 in
1955. Either one position or the other is untenable.
In plaintiffs' brief various cases are cited purporting to uphold their amended complaint. Said cases are
cited and discussed both in plaintiffs' brief and in the
plaintiffs' memorandum which is made a part of the
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record before this court. All cases are readily distinguishable from the case at bar. Adamson v. Brockbank,
112 Utah 52, 185 P(2d) 264, which sets forth various
elements which plaintiffs claim fit the instant case, is a
case where the Brockbank holdings carried a servitude
with the Adamson holdings being the dominant estate.
There is a direct privity between the grantor to each
party and the parties involved in the lawsuit. The ditch
in that case had been in continuous use, and Brockbank
was enough aware of that use and the servitude arising
from the ditch that he had fraudulently acquired a quitclaim deed to that easement. The Brockbank case set
forth the essential elements to constitute an easement by
severance as follows :
(1) Unity of title followed by severance;
(2) That at the time of the severance the
servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible;
(3) That the easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and
(4) It must usually be continuous and selfacting, as distinguished from one used only from
time to time when occasion arises.
With respect to unity of title at severance: In the
instant case at the time of severance according to plaintiffs' facts, the ditch was running along the "blue" route
(R. 50), and ran from the present site of Lot 6 to the
present site of Lot 3, and there was at that time no servitude in Lot 3 and no dominant estate in Lot 6 creating a
servitude in Lot 3.
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Plaintiffs allege a unity of title at the time of conveyance of Lot 6, complaint, paragraph 5(a) (R. 14),
but rebut said unity in the chain of title set forth by
plaintiffs (R. 41).
They claim obvious notice to the defendant of a
servitude by alleging subdividing and dedication of a
subdivision in 1947 (R. 41), severance in 1950 (R. 41),
and then allege construction of a ditch in 1952, and still
claim an obvious and visible servitude (plaintiffs' brief,
page 8).
Again in Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Penn. 178, 86 Am.
Dec. 577, a servitude between two estates is set forth
which existed at the time of severance. In the instant
case there had never been a servitude in which Lot 6 was
the dominant estate and Lot 3 the servient estate at any
time while there was a unity of ownership. This is plainly set forth by the plaintiffs' pleadings and plaintiffs'
memoranda, and plaintiffs' map or plat.
Plaintiffs' third claim is reasonable necessity. The
plaintiffs allege three ditch routes to Lot 6 (see Plat, R.
50) from the same water source, the last by which they
claim an easement over Lot 3 existing since 1955 after
both parties had received title to their lots. However,
under all plaintiffs' pleadings it is apparent that (a) the
ditch existing at the time of the dedication of the subdivision in 1947 ("blue" route, R. 50) was discontinued,
and (b) the ditch over which this litigation arose in the
rear five feet of Lot 3 had never been of benefit to Lot
6 prior to 1955, the first time, according to plaintiffs'
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pleadings, that water had come to Lot 6 through this
ditch. It is obvious from the plaintiffs' plat and from
their pleadings that a more reasonable route for the
water from its source to Lot 6 is on the original or "blue"
route (R. 50) "rherein it involves only two lots in Block
1, a much shorter route than the "red" route or the
ublack" route set forth by the plaintiffs.
As to the question of a utility easement, the plaintiffs as a sideline attempt to claim that the portion of
each lot, to wit, the rear five feet reserved as a utility
easement was intended and should be construed as containing a ditch for irrigation vvater. Holladay Heights
Plat "A" in its dedication carried the reservation of a
five foot utility easement at the rear of each lot and
betvveen Lots 7 and 8 of Block 1. Plaintiffs' Plat with
the various ditch routes (R. 50) sets forth graphically
that the "blue" or original route existing at the time of
dedication of the subdivision is the logical route for the
\\'ay of necessity to Lot 6 and obviates the claim of necessity for the ditch in litigation.
If their claim that the utility easements contemplated irrigation water as a utility was valid, the easements between Lots 7 and 8 of Block 1, Holladay Heights
Plat "A", would be just as available and more convenient
by several hundred feet than either the "red" or the
'black" route, and by plaintiffs' own pleadings this was
the source of water to the ground encompassed by Lot 6
for some thirty-five years prior to 1950 and also at the
time of dedication of the subdivision in 1947. True, the
4
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"black" route claimed by the plaintiff is the only route
which would obviate the necessity of a ditch across plaintiffs' own Lot 6, or does the plaintiff contend that Lots 7
and 8 of Block 1 are entitled to have an easement across
Lot 6, Block 2, because at the time of dedication of the
subdivision in 1947 water ran in a ditch from Lots 7 and
8 to Lot 6, Block 2.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO PERMIT PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT
FOLLO·WING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The plaintiffs contend that their motion to set aside
the summary judgment was timely due to notification by
mail on July 31, 1959, and that notice by mail extends the
time for three days under U.R.C.P. 1953. However, they
forget that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1953 do
not require notice of entry of judgment. Rule 59(b)
provides that a motion for new trial shall be served within ten days of entry of judgment and differs from 10440-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943 in that the present rule
requires no notice of entry of judgn1ent in an action not
tried to a jury.
Plaintiffs' motions for new trial, to amend, and to
maintain the status quo were not timely but were denied
by the court on their own merits rather than the matter
of time.
Plaintiff filed t'vo second a1nended complaints but
never obtained leave of court for such filing in accordance with Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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1953 (see order dated August 11, 1959, R. 27-28.).
While defendants agree that amendments should be
liberally allowed in the interests of justice and on timely
application, it is apparent from the record in the case at
bar that ap·plication was not made for the second amended complaint nor for the amended complaint in lieu of
the second amended complaint until after judgment had
been entered by Judge Hanson and after time for filing
for new trial had expired. The pleadings as a whole,
including the second amended complaint do not state a
cause of action, and a cause of action cannot be stated in
the instant case. By plaintiffs' own pleadings it is apparent that there has never been a servitude in Lot 3
with Lot 6 being a dominant estate, and the time that
the contested portion of the ditch has been used is not
sufficient to create either a prescriptive right or a right
by adverse possession, and plaintiffs' pleadings further
show (as does their plat) that there is no right-of-way
by reasonable necessity.

CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is urged that the lower court's summary judgment be affirmed and defendants and respondents be granted their costs.
Respectfully submitted,

SUMNER J. HATCH
Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FILE
r~AR

1 5 1960

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

